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Abstract
We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is
to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms
and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing
mechanisms satisfying ex-post eciency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which
is ex-post individually rational. We discuss connections with the standard Bayesian-Nash
framework for both linear and binary-search mechanisms. On a more general level, we show
that if entitlements are unequal, ex-post eciency and ex-post individual rationality impose
signicant restrictions on permissible mechanisms. In particular, they rule out both linear and
binary-search mechanisms.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Related Work
Many partnership agreements include buy-sell clauses that stipulate that a partnership may be
dissolved if one partner (the proposer) oers to buy out the other partner (the responder) at some
proposed price for each share. While the responder may accept this oer, she may also turn this
oer around and buy out the proposer at the same price [3, 7, 15].
We propose a class of symmetric procedures, whereby the partners make simultaneous oers;
the partner who makes the higher oer becomes the buyer and the other partner the seller, where
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1the price is some intermediate value. When two partners have equal entitlements (i.e., 50 percent
each), this procedure satises several desirable properties. For example, under specied conditions
for determining the price, an optimal strategy of the partners is to be truthful in order to minimize
their maximum regret, a goal likely to be appealing to risk-averse partners. It also relieves the
proposer in standard buy-sell from having to make herself indierent between being the buyer
or being the seller, like the cutter in \I cut, you choose." When the partners are truthful, it is
ecient in awarding the partnership to the partner that values it more.
To set the stage for our analysis, consider a group of agents that jointly owns an indivisible
good. Each agent is entitled to a fraction of the good, and the fractions sum to 1. In addition,
each agent attaches some value to obtaining sole ownership of the good. Our objective is to
design procedures for allocating the good to one agent and compensating the other agents for
not obtaining it. While this general class of problems|commonly referred to as partnership-
dissolution problems|has been extensively studied in the literature [4, 12, 5], almost all of the
existing work (with the notable exception of Linhart [8] and Linhart and Radner [9]) assumes
that agent valuations are independently drawn from distributions that are common knowledge.
The distinguishing feature of this paper is its focus on minimizing maximum regret, which is
dened as the worst-case dierence between the actual prot achieved by an agent and her optimal
prot, given complete information. An important advantage of this approach is its substantial
weakening of the common-prior assumption.
Specically, it suces to assume that agent valuations are drawn from an interval whose
endpoints are common knowledge. Because our model focuses on the worst case, it is insensitive
to the particular manner in which agent valuations are drawn. In contrast, the traditional model
is sensitive to the distribution of valuations, because it seeks to optimize expected prot.
The partnership-dissolution problem has a rich history in the economic-theory literature. Typ-
ically, it is modeled as a bargaining game in which players maximize expected prot in a Bayesian-
Nash framework. The key properties explored are ex-post eciency, individual rationality, and
incentive compatibility. A brief description of these concepts is warranted: Ex-post eciency is
satised if and only if the agent with the highest valuation receives the good; interim individual
rationality is satised if the mechanism aords positive expected prot to all agents at the interim
stage (i.e., after each agent learns her valuation), regardless of the agents' valuations. Finally, a
mechanism is said to be incentive-compatible if it induces agents to be truthful in their equilibrium
bidding for the good.
Chatterjee and Samuelson [4] consider an important special case of the partnership-dissolution
problem in which there are two agents, one of whom (the seller) owns the entire good. They assume
2that agents' valuations for the good are independently distributed random variables and analyze
linear-pricing mechanisms, wherein the price of the good is a convex combination of the players'
two bids. In this context, they derive a necessary and sucient condition for equilibrium bidding
strategies. They give an explicit solution for the case of symmetric uniform [0,1] valuations and a
split-the-dierence price|that is, when the price is set to be the mean of the two bids, provided
the seller bids less than the buyer. They show that the seller has an incentive to overstate her
true valuation when it is below 3/4, whereas the buyer has an incentive to understate her true
valuation when it is above 1/4; they also show that under certain conditions, a mutually benecial
trade will not occur in equilibrium, rendering the mechanism inecient.
Myerson and Satterthwaite [12] generalize this two agent buyer-seller framework. In contrast
to [4], they do not restrict their analysis to linear-pricing mechanisms. They provide a character-
ization of all incentive-compatible and interim individually rational mechanisms, showing these
two properties to be incompatible with ex-post eciency. Their result delineates the limitations
inherent in dissolving a partnership in a satisfactory manner.
An important generalization of the Myerson-Satterthwaite model, due to Cramton, Gibbons
and Klemperer [5], assumes n agents who each own a share ri of the good, where
Pn
i=1 ri = 1.1
They depart from the standard model by allowing for a redistribution of the partnership ownership
shares, thereby not limiting their attention to its dissolution (wherein one agent is assumed to take
sole possession of the good). In this context, they characterize the set of all incentive-compatible
and individually rational mechanisms. Furthermore, they provide a simple necessary and sucient
condition for such mechanisms to be ex-post ecient. Essentially, such a dissolution is possible
if and only if initial endowments are suciently close to the equal-endowment vector; ecient
dissolution is never possible for extreme cases of ownership asymmetry, such as in the buyer-seller
framework.
McAfee [10] examines simple mechanisms for dissolving equal-share two-agent partnerships
with an arbitrary degree of risk aversion and derives equilibrium strategies for the mechanisms
considered. His model allows for an \outside option," which can be exercised only if both parties
agree to it. One of these mechanisms (winner's bid auction), whereby the agent with the highest
bid pays the loser one half of her bid, is ex-post ecient.
1To recover the Myerson and Satterthwaite model [12], set n = 2, r1 = 1, and r2 = 0.
31.2 Our Focus
A key element in the partnership-dissolution problem is that an agent does not know exactly the
bids of the other agents. If an agent (somehow) obtains this information, her strategy is very
simple to calculate. We evaluate the ecacy of any given strategy by comparing it to the agent's
optimal strategy in hindsight (presuming she has complete information about the bids of the other
agents). The smaller this dierence, the better her strategy, because she is closer to her optimum.
Of course, this dierence is sensitive to the particular values (and hence bids) of the other
agents. We therefore focus on the worst dierence, where \worst" is dened with respect to the
valuations of all the other agents. The dierence between an agent's actual prot and her optimal
prot is her regret.
We focus on nding a strategy whose maximum regret is minimized. This approach has its
roots in traditional decision theory [14] and is standard in the analysis of online algorithms in
computer science [2] (although there the focus is on relative regret as opposed to absolute regret).
Perhaps most relevant to our work is a paper by Linhart and Radner [9], in which the authors study
a bilateral bargaining game under the assumption that agents seek to minimize their maximum
regret. Similar to [4] and [12], they introduce a buyer-seller framework and examine a sealed bid,
split-the-dierence mechanism in which trade occurs if and only if the buyer outbids the seller.
They assume that bargaining occurs over both price and quantity and derive regret-optimizing
strategies. Linhart discusses the minimax-regret objective in bargaining games further in [8].
Important recent applications of minimax regret appear in robust newsvendor models [13] and
robust monopoly pricing [1, 6].
Organization of the Paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we for-
mally dene the model and our concept of regret. In Section 3 we focus on the family of linear
mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies for the two-agent model. In Section 4 we
discuss a special binary search mechanism and prove that it induces a truthful regret-optimizing
equilibrium. If agents' valuations are drawn from independent uniform [0,1] distributions, then
the binary search mechanism induces a truthful Bayesian-Nash equilibrium as well. In Section 5
we show that, when entitlements are unequal, the linear and binary-search mechanisms do not
maintain their attractive properties. In such entitlement environments, ex-post eciency and
ex-post individual rationality impose signicant restrictions on permissible mechanisms.
42 Model Description
2.1 Two Agents
Our model has two agents, denoted 1 and 2. Each agent i owns a 50-percent share of the
partnership. In addition, each values the partnership at vi, which is private information but
is known to be in the interval [0;1]. We emphasize that no additional assumptions are made
about the valuations. In particular, we do not assume that they come from distributions that are
common knowledge, which is a restrictive assumption made in the standard approach.
We analyze direct mechanisms in which the two agents simultaneously submit sealed bids b1
and b2 for the partnership. A mechanism p is a function which takes as input the bids of the agents
and determines who gets the partnership (or good), and at what price. We restrict ourselves to
mechanisms in which the good is always awarded to the agent submitting the higher bid, at a price
p(b1;b2), which is also the amount of money transferred to the low bidder (thus, the mechanism
is budget-balanced). Even within this class, we focus on mechanisms that satisfy two additional
properties:
(a) Convexity: The price p(b1;b2) is at most the high bid and at least the low bid; and
(b) Anonymity: The price p(b1;b2) does not depend on the identity of the bidders, i.e.,
p(b;b0) = p(b0;b).
We assume that the agents have linear utilities, so that an agent with valuation v and owning
a share r of the partnership has a utility of rv. Suppose b1 > b2 so that agent 1 is awarded the
partnership. When r = 1=2, the utilities of agents 1 and 2 after the dissolution are given by
v1   p(b1;b2)=2 and p(b1;b2)=2; respectively, whereas their initial utilities are, respectively, v1=2
and v2=2. The prot of agent 1 is therefore
v1   p(b1;b2)=2   v1=2 = (v1   p(b1;b2))=2:
Similarly, agent 2's prot is given by
p(b1;b2)=2   v2=2 = (p(b1;b2)   v2)=2:
2.2 Regret
The distinguishing feature of our approach is the performance measure used to evaluate a bid-
ding strategy. This measure is standard in computer science [2], and is increasingly used in
economics [1] and operations research [13].
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prot, where the optimal prot is calculated by assuming that the agent knows the other agent's
bid. That is, an agent's optimal prot is the best that she could have done in hindsight. This is
especially easy to calculate in the case of two agents: Suppose agent i's valuation is v, and the
other agent's bid is ^ b. Then it is optimal for agent i to bid slightly above ^ b to obtain the good if
^ b < v; and it is optimal for agent i to bid slightly below ^ b to sell her share of the partnership if
^ b > v. Note that in the rst case, agent i gets the good at the lowest possible price, and in the
second case, agent i sells the good at the highest possible price. In both cases, i's optimal bid is
the bid of the other agent, slightly perturbed upwards or downwards.
The measure that we use to evaluate a bidding strategy is worst-case regret, where the worst
case is over all possible bids of the other agent. In other words, we hypothesize that each agent
acts as if to minimize her maximum regret. The information in Table 1 is useful in nding a
bidding strategy that minimizes the maximum regret.
Focusing on player 1, we suppose she has a valuation of v1 and bids b1, while we denote her
opponent's bid by ^ b. The columns Actual and Optimal refer to an agent's actual and optimal
prots, respectively. An agent's regret is taken to equal the dierence between her optimal and
actual prots. We then enumerate four cases that give rise to dierent actual and optimal prots,
and therefore regret. For example, the third row of the table describes the situation in which
agent 1 wins the good with a bid of b1, and the optimal strategy (in hindsight) is for agent 1 to
lose the bidding with a bid that is slightly less than her opponent's. In each case we now take ^ b so
Cases Actual Optimal Regret
b1 > ^ b;^ b  v1 (v1   p(b1;^ b))=2 (v1   p(^ b;^ b))=2 (p(b1;^ b)  ^ b)=2
b1  ^ b;^ b > v1 (p(b1;^ b)   v1)=2 (p(^ b;^ b)   v1)=2 (^ b   p(b1;^ b))=2
b1 > ^ b;^ b > v1 (v1   p(b1;^ b))=2 (p(^ b;^ b)   v1)=2 ^ b=2 + p(b1;^ b)=2   v1
b1  ^ b;^ b  v1 (p(b1;^ b)   v1)=2 (v1   p(^ b;^ b))=2 v1  ^ b=2   p(b1;^ b)=2
Table 1: Actual and Optimal Prots: Case Analysis
as to maximize regret|this is the worst possible regret of agent 1, assuming she knows nothing
at all about agent 2's valuation or bid (except for the range of agent 2's valuation). We arrive
at the following expression for maximum regret, as a function of agent 1's valuation and bid. An
6equivalent expression holds for agent 2.
R1(b1) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
maxfp(b1;^ b)  ^ bg=2; ^ b  minfb1;v1g
maxf^ b   p(b1;^ b)g=2; ^ b  maxfb1;v1g
b1   v1; b1 > v1
v1   b1; b1  v1
Thus, given a mechanism p, both agents wish to compute bidding strategies, b1 and b2, which, in
equilibrium, minimize the functions R1(b1) and R2(b2), respectively.
2.3 Properties of Mechanisms
Armed with the particular way in which bidding strategies are evaluated, we now state properties
that we would like a mechanism to satisfy. These properties have analogs in the standard Bayesian-
Nash setting that we will also investigate.
Eciency. A mechanism p is said to be ex-post ecient if there are equilibrium (regret-
optimizing) strategies which always award the good to the agent with the highest valuation.
In other words, if b1() and b2() are equilibrium (regret-optimizing) strategies induced by the
mechanism p, ex-post eciency implies:
v1  v2 , b1(v1)  b2(v2) 8v1;v2:
Individual Rationality. A mechanism p is said to be ex-post individually rational if it guar-
antees a non-negative payo under any realization of the valuations. Specically, if b1() and b2()
are the equilibrium regret-optimizing strategies induced by the mechanism p, ex-post individual
rationality implies for i = 1;2 and j 6= i:
vi   p(bi(vi);bj(vj))  0; 8f(vi;vj) : bi(vi)  bj(vj)g;
p(bi(vi);bj(vj))   vi  0; 8f(vi;vj) : bi(vi)  bj(vj)g:
Truthfulness. A mechanism p is said to be truthful if it admits a regret-optimizing equilibrium
in which agents bid truthfully. Truthful bidding for an agent i is taken to mean bi(vi) = vi.
The following proposition shows that ex-post individual rationality and truthfulness are equiva-
lent.
Proposition 1 A mechanism is ex-post individually rational if and only if it is truthful.
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is obvious. To show the converse, assume that the mechanism p is ex-post individually rational
and that agent 1 observes a valuation of v1. Then for b1() and b2() to be equilibrium strategies
induced by p, we must have:
p(b1(v1);b2(v2))  v1; 8v2 : b2(v2)  b1(v1);
p(b1(v1);b2(v2))  v1; 8v2 : b2(v2)  b1(v1):
Hence, p(b1(v1);b1(v1)) = v1. On the other hand, convexity implies p(b1(v1);b1(v1)) = b1(v1).
Putting the two equalities together, we conclude that b1(v1) = v1.
Because truthfulness implies ex-post eciency, we have the following:
Proposition 2 If a mechanism p is ex-post individually rational, it is ex-post ecient.
3 Linear Mechanisms
In this section we focus on a natural class of mechanisms in which the price is set to be a convex
combination of the bids. If the agents bid b1 and b2, respectively, the partnership is sold to the
highest bidder at the price p = minfb1;b2g+(1 )maxfb1;b2g for  2 [0;1]. (Note that p is 
times the low bid plus (1 ) times the high bid.) If  = 1=2, the two agents split the dierence,
yielding the canonical mechanism in this class.
3.1 Linear Mechanisms and Regret
The main result in this section is the derivation of regret-optimizing strategies for two agents.
That this analysis extends to the case of more than two agents is straightforward.2 We compare
dierent linear mechanisms in terms of their min-max regret and show that there is no dominance
relation between any two mechanisms within this class.
Theorem 1 Fix a linear mechanism . The regret-optimizing bidding strategy for agents i = 1;2
is given by:
bi(vi) =
8
> > <
> > :
2
2+vi + 
3 0  vi 
(2+)
3

(2+)
3  vi 
(4 )
3
2
3 vi +
(1 )
3(3 )
(4 )
3  vi  1
(1)
2Proof available upon request.
8Proof. Let b1() be the bidding strategy of agent 1. We search for a symmetric equilibrium.
Upon learning her valuation to be v1, she places a bid of b1(v1). Suppose also that agent 2's bids
are in the interval [c;d] for 0  c  d  1. As we showed in Section 2, the function that agent 1
wishes to minimize is the following.
R1(b1) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(d   b1)=2; d  maxfv1;b1g
(1   )(b1   c)=2; c  minfv1;b1g
b1   v1; b1 > v1
v1   b1; b1  v1
The optimal bidding strategy|a b() that minimizes the maximum regret|can now be derived
by examining three cases separately.
First, consider the case v1 < c. In this case, the regret is the larger of (d b1)=2 and jv1 b1j.
For b1  v1, both of these expressions decrease with an increase in b1, so the optimal b1 is at least
v1 and is given by the point of intersection of (d   b1)=2 and b1   v1, which results in
b1 =
v1
1 + =2
+
d=2
1 + =2
:
Next, consider the case v1 > d. In this case, the regret is the larger of (1   )(b1   c)=2 and
jv1   b1j. For b1  v1, both of these expressions increase with an increase in b1, so the optimal
b1 is at most v1 and is given by the point of intersection of (1   )(b1   c2)=2 and v1   b1, which
results in
b1 =
v1
1 + (1   )=2
+
(1   )c=2
1 + (1   )=2
:
These two cases already x the values of c and d. If agent 1 observes a value of v1  c. she bids
at least her valuation, so c  0; similarly, if she observes v1  d, she bids at most her valuation,
so d  1. Furthermore, as the bidding range is assumed to be contained in [c;d], we may assume
that agent 1 with a value of 0 bids exactly c , and that agent 1 with a value of 1 bids exactly d.
These observations lead to the equations
c =
d=2
1 + =2
d =
1 + (1   )c=2
1 + (1   )=2
;
which, when solved, yield
c =

3
d =
2 + 
3
We now turn to the case in which v1 2 [c;d]. We consider two subcases, depending on whether
or not b1  v1. In each of these cases, the optimal strategy is determined by either the intersection
9of (d b1)=2 and (1 )(b1  c)=2, or by the intersection of one of these two terms with v1  b1.
The rst two intersect at d + (1   )c, which becomes  when we substitute for the values of
c and d. (The other intersections have already been calculated in our analysis of the rst two
cases.) Specically, for b1  v1, the optimal strategy is
b(v) =
(
; 0  v1  u
2
3 v +
(1 )
3(3 ); u  v1  1
where u is dened as the point of intersection of the two functions, i.e.,
 =
2u
3   
+
(1   )
3(3   )
) u =
(4   )
3
:
Following the same reasoning, for b1  v1, the optimal strategy is
b1(v1) =
(
2
2+v1 + 
3 0  v1 
(2+)
3 ;
; l  v1  1
where l is dened as the point of intersection of the two functions, i.e.,
 =
2l
2 + 
+

3
) l =
(2 + )
3
:
Simple algebra veries 0  l  u  1. Putting these cases together, we nd that the optimal
bidding strategy is:
b1(v1) =
8
> > <
> > :
2
2+v1 + 
3 0  v1 
(2+)
3

(2+)
3  v1 
(4 )
3
2
3 v1 +
(1 )
3(3 )
(4 )
3  v1  1
An equivalent expression holds for agent 2.
We now briey comment on the eciency properties of linear mechanisms.
Proposition 3 The only ex-post ecient linear mechanisms are the ones corresponding to  = 0
and  = 1.
Proof. Examining the bidding strategy in (1), we see that the \at" portion in the middle is
eliminated only when (2 + ) = (4   ), which is true only when  = 0 or 1. In each of
these cases, we note that the bidding strategy in (1), which is identical for both agents, is strictly
increasing.
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nisms, there exists one that fares the best in terms of eciency. We say that a mechanism 1
dominates 2 if its interim regret is weakly lower for every v 2 [0;1], and strictly lower for some
v 2 [0;1]. Conversely, we say that mechanism 2 is dominated by 1. The following proposition
shows that there is no meaningful way to rank mechanisms.
Proposition 4 Fix two linear mechanisms 1 and 2, where i 2 [0;1]. There is no dominance
relation between the two mechanisms.
Proof. It is easy to see that for  2 [0;1], min max regret is given by the following expression:
R(;v) =
8
> > <
> > :

3   
2+v 0  v 
(2+)
3
(1 )
3
(2+)
3  v 
(4 )
3
1 
3 v  
(1 )
3(3 )
(4 )
3  v  1
From the above it follows that there is no mechanism that simultaneously minimizes maximum
regret for every v 2 [0;1]. The argument goes as follows. Fix two mechanisms 1 and 2. Initially
assume 0 < 2 < 1 < 1. Then for v 2 [0;2(2 + 2)=3], the mechanism 1 has a higher regret
than 2. Conversely, for v 2 [1(4   1)=3;1], the mechanism 2 has higher regret than 1.
Now assume that 0 < 1 < 1 and that 2 = 0, whose regret is given by 1=3v. Then for v
small enough we have v=3 < 1=3   1=(2 + 1)v, whereas for v large enough, we have v=3 >
(1   1)v=(3   1)   1(1   1)=(3(3   1)). So again there is no dominance relation.
Finally we take 0 < 1 < 1 and 2 = 1, whose regret is given by 1=3 v=3. For v large enough
we have 1=3  1=3v < (1   1)(3  1)v  1(1  1)=(3(3   1)), whereas for v small enough we
have 1=3   v=3 > 1=3   1v=(2 + 1). Again, there is no dominance relation.3
Finally, it is not dicult to show that the mechanism  = 1=2 minimizes the worst-case regret
ex-ante. This is because
max
v2[0;1]
R(;v) = max


3
;
(1   )
3

;
which is minimized at  = 1=2. By comparison, the mechanisms  = 0 and  = 1 fare the worst
under this measure.
The above facts are graphically depicted in Figure 1. The gure shows that while  = 1=2 is
overall optimal (i.e., achieves the lowest maximum regret over all possible v's), other 's may be
better for v's outside a \middle" range between 5/12 and 7/12. To minimize maximum regret,
therefore, agents with middling valuations are well-advised to choose a split-the-dierence price
mechanism.
3Note that the mechanisms  = 0;1 do not dominate each other either.
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Figure 1: Regret of Linear Mechanisms with Dierent 's
Linear Mechanisms under Bayesian-Nash We close this section by briey commenting on
linear mechanisms in the traditional Bayesian-Nash prot-maximizing framework. We note the
following theorem due to Cramton et al. [5].
Theorem 2 Suppose there are two agents whose valuations are drawn from a distribution F()
in [0;1] that is common knowledge. Then the bidding strategy
h(v) = v  
R v
F  1()(F(x)   )2dx
(F(v)   )2
is a Nash equilibrium.
In fact, Cramton et al. prove a more general version of this theorem, allowing for an arbitrary
number of agents.
It is not dicult to show that when players use the equilibrium strategy given by Theorem 2,
their regret will be given by
R(;v) =
1
2
max

h(1)   h(v);h(v)   h(0)
	
;
which is never less and sometimes more than that given by the regret-minimizing strategy (Equa-
tion 1) for all v's and 's. Presumably, risk-averse players would prefer the latter strategy over
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy.
124 Binary Search Mechanism
We now turn to a dierent mechanism that resembles the familiar binary search. This mechanism
is attractive, because it satises many of the desirable properties outlined earlier.
Suppose that the agents bid b1 and b2, and it is common knowledge that their valuations are
in [0;1]. The binary search mechanism proceeds as follows: If b1 and b2 are on opposite sides of
1/2, then the procedure terminates, and the good goes to the high bidder with the price set at
1/2. If b1 and b2 are both equal to or less than 1/2, the procedure is applied to the interval of
interest, [0;1=2]. We now check if b1 and b2 are on opposite sides of 1/4, in which case the price
of the good is set at 1/4; otherwise, the interval of interest is halved yet again, and the procedure
is repeated recursively. Similarly, if b1 and b2 are both greater than 1/2, the procedure is applied
to the interval [1=2;1]. This continues until the two agents are on dierent sides of the relevant
candidate price.4
For example, if b1 = 1=8 and b2 = 3=7, the procedure terminates after two steps at which
point the good is sold to agent 2 at a price of 1/4. In theory, this process can take an unbounded
number of iterations to terminate. Clearly, the mechanism is anonymous, and price is always
between the minimum and maximum bids.
We show that this simple mechanism has some attractive properties. First, we prove that
it induces a truthful regret-optimizing equilibrium. Second, in the case of two-agents and i.i.d.
uniform [0,1] valuations, we show that truthful bidding is a Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Binary Search and Regret
We start with the following result:
Theorem 3 The binary search mechanism induces a truthful regret-optimizing equilibrium. It is
therefore ex-post individually rational.
Proof. The worst-case regret is written as:
R(b) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1=2max(^ b   p(b;^ b)); ^ b  maxfv;bg
1=2max(p(b;^ b)  ^ b); ^ b  minfv;bg
b   v; b > v
v   b; b  v
4If an agent's bid is equal to the candidate price, then the mechanism treats the bid as if it were greater than
the price. For instance, p(b1;1=2) = 1=2 if b1 < 1=2.
13Assume that one agent bids truthfully, i.e., b(v) = v. Then truthful bidding by the other agent
will result in a worst-case regret of 1/4. The reasoning is as follows. First, truthfulness implies
that the expressions on the third and fourth lines of the right-hand side of R(b) are zero. Now
assume that a player observes v < 1=2 and bids b(v) = v < 1=2. The worst regret is realized when
her opponent has a valuation of 1 and bids ^ b = 1, leading to 1=2max(^ b p(b;^ b)) that gives a regret
of 1=2(1   p(1;b(v))) = 1=2(1   1=2) = 1=4. Similarly, when b(v) = v  1=2, the worst regret is
realized when her opponent has a valuation of 0 and bids ^ b = 0, leading to 1=2max(p(b;^ b)   ^ b)
that gives regret of 1=2(1=2   0) = 1=4. Thus, we have established that truthfulness yields a
maximum regret of 1/4.
Now assume that a player deviates and bids b(v) 6= v. If jb(v) vj > 1=4, then she does strictly
worse than if she were truthful. If jb(v)   vj  1=4, then the expressions on the rst and second
lines of the right-hand side of R(b) will again have a maximum regret of 1/4, because the other
agent will be truthful and will bid up in the whole interval [0;1]. In fact, any strategy of the sort
jb(v)   vj  1=4 will be a best response to truthful bidding.
Ecient Equilibrium. While truthful bidding is an equilibrium, it is not an ecient one.
That is, it does not achieve the lowest maximum regret among all equilibria. Suppose that an
agent does not bid truthfully and rather bids in an interval [c;d], where 0  c  1=2  d  1 and
c = 1   d. Then the function to be minimized is the following:
R(b) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1
2(d   1=2); v  d;b  1=2
1
2(1=2   c); v  c;b  1=2
b   v; b > v
v   b; b  v
A similar analysis to that in the previous section shows that c = 1=6 and d = 5=6, from which
we obtain the symmetric equilibrium strategy b(v) = 2=3v + 1=6, yielding a worst-case regret of
1/6. This equilibrium is clearly better than the truthful one. But the gain in eciency comes at
a price: The strategies are no longer ex-post individually rational.
4.2 Uniform Distributions and Nash Equilibria
In this section we focus on two agents with uniform [0,1] valuations and prove that bidding one's
valuation is a Nash equilibrium. We show that this result is not true in the case of general
distributions.
14Theorem 4 Suppose that the agents' valuations are iid uniform [0,1] random variables. The
binary search mechanism induces a truthful Nash equilibrium. It is therefore ex-post individually
rational.
Proof. Suppose that agents do not submit sealed bids but rather are allowed simultaneously to
declare if they are above or below the candidate price. That is, in round 1 they declare if they
are above or below 1/2. If there is a second round, they declare if they are above or below 1/4 or
3/4, and so on. In this dynamic game, we will show that truthfulness is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Suppose that agent 2 bids truthfully and that agent 1's valuation is v1 = 1=2 , where   0.5
Since agent 2 is truthful, her bid will be uniformly distributed in [0,1].
Assuming agent 1 is truthful, let her payo, should the game end in the kth round, be indexed
by 1(k). Denoting the candidate price at stage k by p(k), we may write
1(k) =
1
2

 
v1   p(k)

 

Clearly, if the game ends in period 1, then 1(1) = =2. If k > 1, then 1(k) is bounded from
below by the quantity 1
2
 1
2k   

. We can establish this with the following simple argument:
1(k) =
1
2
 
 v1   p(k)
 
  =
1
2
 
 
1
2
     p(k)
 
  
1
2

1
2
     p(k)


1
2

1
2k   

:
Since agent 2 is truthful, the probability that the game ends at stage k is simply the probability
that the agent's valuation lies in the relevant interval of length 1=2k. It is thus equal to 1=2k. So,
player 1's expected payo 1 will satisfy:
1 =
1
2
1 X
i=1
1
2k1(k) 
1
2


2
+
1 X
k=2
1
2k
  1
2k   

=
1
24
with equality if and only if  = 0.
Now let us return to agent 1's actual strategy. Without loss of generality, assume that she is
not truthful in the rst round and declares a valuation that is greater than 1/2. After her initial
misrepresentation, suppose that she is truthful up to time k1  1, where k1  2. Should the game
end in round k, where 2  k  k1   1, her payo will be ~ 1(k) = 1=2k + . Now suppose that
at time k1 she is again untruthful. Then should the game end at that time, her payo will be
~ 1(k1) =  1=2k1  . If the game does not end then, assume that she is again truthful from time
5An analogous argument works for   0.
15k1 + 1 until k2   1. In all those rounds her payo will be 1=2k + 1=2k1 + . At time k2 it will be
 1=2k2   1=2k1   . We can repeat this reasoning for all subsequent successive time periods in
which agent 1 is untruthful.
It is evident that for any strategy that agent 1 adopts, all relevant information is captured
by these successive intervals of truthful and untruthful behavior. Writing the expected prot we
obtain
~ 1 =
1 X
k=1
1
2k ~ 1(k) =
1
2

 

2
+
k1 1 X
k=2
1
2k
  1
2k + 

 
1
2k1
  1
2k1 + 

+
+
k2 1 X
k=k1+1
1
2k
  1
2k +
1
2k1 + 

 
1
2k2
  1
2k2 +
1
2k1 + 

+ :::

:
Focus on the terms f;1=2k1;1=2k2;:::g. These terms are subtracted from the agent's payo should
the game end in rounds ff1;k1;k2;:::g;fk1;k2;::g;fk2;:::g;:::g, respectively. Furthermore, these
losses will never be fully recovered by truthful behavior in previous and later rounds. For example,
focusing on  we have
 

2
+
k1 1 X
k=2
  
2k

 

2k1 +
k2 1 X
k=k1+1
  
2k

 

2k2 + :::  0;
with equality if and only if k1 = 1. Applying this logic to all terms 1=2k such that k corresponds
to a round in which agent 1 is untruthful, we may write:
~ 1 
1
2


2
+
1 X
k=2
1
2k
  1
2k   

:
Thus we can conclude that
~ 1  1
with equality if and only if  = 0 and k1 = 1. In fact, we also have
~ 1  ^ 1
where ^ 1 is the agent's payo when she is untruthful only in round 1 and is truthful thereafter.
This observation establishes that the equilibrium is subgame-perfect.
General Distributions. The binary search mechanism as described is designed specically with
the uniform distribution in mind. For general distributions, the most obvious way to extend it
would be to x prices in terms of the distribution quantiles. Thus, if the two bids are on opposite
16sides of the 50-percent quantile, then the price is set to that quantile. The process iterates on
either the 25-percent or 75-percent quantile, and so on.
When valuations are generally distributed, it is easy to construct examples in which truthful
reporting is not a Nash equilibrium. Let 1;2;3 be the 50, 25, and 75-percent quantiles,
respectively. Assume that r1 = r2, agent 2 is truthful, and v1 < 1. A truthful response will yield
the payo
1 =
1
2

1
2
(1   v1) +
1
4
 2   v1
  + :::

:
Now assume that, instead, agent 1 bids exactly 1. This will yield the payo
~ 1 =
1
2

1
2
(v1   1) +
1
4
(3   v1) + :::

:
Now we can see that if v1 is close enough to 1 and 2, and if 3 is far enough from 1, then
1
2
(1   v1) +
1
4
j2   v1j <
1
2
(v1   1) +
1
4
(3   v1):
We observe that if the distribution's right tail is suciently heavy, bidding 1 dominates bidding
v1.
5 Unequal Entitlements and General Mechanisms
As we saw in sections 3 and 4, when both agents have a 50-percent entitlement to the partner-
ship and wish to minimize maximum regret, linear mechanisms with  2 f0;1g achieve ex-post
eciency. The binary-search mechanism performs even better: It is ex-post individually rational.
Furthermore, as we established in Theorem 4, it maintains this appealing property even when
agents have uniform [0,1] i.i.d. valuations and wish to maximize expected prot.
In this section we show that the attractive properties of the linear mechanisms and the binary-
search mechanism do not extend when entitlements are unequal. In addition, we show that, on a
general level, ex-post eciency and ex-post individual rationality place signicant restrictions on
the kinds of mechanisms that may be used.
5.1 Linear Mechanisms
Proposition 5 When r1 6= r2, there is no ex-post ecient linear mechanism.
17Proof. When r1 6= r2, using a similar technique as in the proof of Theorem 1,6 the regret-
optimizing bidding strategy for agent i is given by
bi(vi) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
vi
1+ri + ri
1+ri 0  vi  li
ri
1+ri
1+ri
+(1 )rj
rj
1+rj
ri+(1 )rj li  vi  ui
vi
1+(1 )rj +
(1 )rj
rj
1+rj
1+(1 )rj ui  vi  1
where li and ui are such that bi(vi) is continuous.
Let us rst assume that  > 0. This immediately implies that l1;l2 > 0. Now, pick v1 = v2 =
v  minfl1;l2g. By eciency and continuity we must have
v1 = v2 ) b1(v1) = b2(v2):
Recalling that v1 = v2 = v,  > 0, and r2 = 1   r1, we may write:
v
1 + r1
+
r1
1 + r1
=
v
1 + (1   r1)
+
(1   r1)
1 + (1   r1)
) r1 =
1
2
:
But this contradicts our hypothesis that r1 6= r2.
Now let us examine the case where  = 0. Here we have u1 = u2 = 0. Assume we have
v1 = v2  0 = u1. Applying the same argument as before and substituting  = 0, we obtain:
v
1 + (1   r1)
=
v
1 + r1
) r1 =
1
2
:
Once again, we arrive at a contradiction.
5.2 Binary-Search Mechanism
Our next result shows that the truthfulness of the binary search mechanism depends critically
on the equal-entitlement prole. This limitation is present regardless of whether agents wish to
minimize maximum regret or maximize expected prot.
Proposition 6 Assume that agents wish to minimize maximum regret. The binary search mech-
anism cannot be truthful for any unequal-entitlement prole.
6Details available upon request.
18Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that r1 > r2. The worst-case regret for player 1 is
R1(b1) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
r1 max(^ b   p(b1;^ b)); ^ b  maxfv1;b1g
r2 max(p(b1;^ b)  ^ b); ^ b  minfv1;b1g
b1   v1; b1 > v1
v1   b1; b1  v1
Assume that agent 2 bids truthfully, i.e., b2(v2) = v2. Then truthful bidding by agent 1 will
result in a worst-case regret that is given by the following function:
R1(b1) = max
(
maxfr1
2 ;r2p(v1;0)g = r1
2 ; v1 < 1
2
maxfr1(1   p(v1;1)); r2
2 g; v1  1
2
Now assume that agent 1, instead of being truthful, bids according to the strategy:
b1(v1) = max

v1 +
r2
2
;1

:
Then it is easy to see that the maximum regret associated with this strategy is
~ R1(b1) = max
8
> > <
> > :
r1
2 ; v1 < 1
2   r2
2
maxfr1(1   p(v1 + r2
2 ;1)); r2
2 g; 1
2   r2
2  v1  1   r2
2
r2
2 ; v1  1   r2
2
It is immediate that
~ R1(b1(v1))  R1(v1) 8v 2 [0;1]:
If r1 < 1, then we also have that ~ R1(b1(v1)) < R1(v1) for at least one v1 2 [0;1], so the dominance
is strict. If r1 = 1, then the maximum regret of a policy b1 is given by
~ R1(b1) = max
8
> > <
> > :
1
2; b1 < 1
2
1   p(b1;1); b1  1
2
jb1   v1j
In this case, it is easy to see that a truthful bidding strategy is dominated by a host of others, for
example by b1 such that
b1(v1) = max
8
> > <
> > :
v1 + 1
4; v1  1
4
1
2; 1
4 < v1  1
2
v1; 1
2 < v1  1
19Proposition 7 Assume that agents wish to maximize expected prot and that their valuations
are iid uniform [0,1] random variables. The binary search mechanism cannot be truthful for any
prole of unequal entitlements.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume r1 < r2. Now suppose that agent 2 is truthful and
agent 1 observes a valuation of v1 = 1=2. Recalling that the binary search mechanism treats a bid
of 1/2 as if it were greater than 1/2, agent 1's expected prot under a truthful bidding strategy
will be
1 =
1
2
0 +
1
4

r1
1
4

+
1
8

r1
1
8

+ ::: =
r1
12
:
Now suppose agent 1 deviates and instead bids just slightly below 1/2. Her expected prot will
be arbitrarily close to
~ 1 =
1
2
0 +
1
4

r2
1
4

+
1
8

r2
1
8

+ :::: =
r2
12
:
Since r2 > r1, we have ~ 1 > 1. Thus, the mechanism cannot be truthful.
We end this section by noting that although the binary-search mechanism satises certain
desirable properties, it is applicable only under restrictive conditions. By contrast, the class
of linear mechanisms can be used in more general situations, but it it not ex-post individually
rational for the special cases that we have examined.
5.3 General Mechanisms
We now consider the general mechanism-design version of the problem. Specically, we ask if it
is possible to design any mechanism satisfying all the desirable properties outlined earlier.
Ex-post Eciency and Regret. As we saw in sections 3 and 4, when entitlement proles are
equal and agents wish to minimize maximum regret, both linear mechanisms (with  2 f0;1g)
and the binary-search mechanism are ex-post ecient. At the same time, both fail to achieve
ex-post eciency when entitlements are unequal. The following theorem establishes that a large
class of mechanisms cannot hope to ever achieve ex-post eciency.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the agents' objective is to minimize maximum regret. Consider the
class of mechanisms p such that
@p
b1 ;
@p
b2 > 0 for all b1;b2. Any such mechanism cannot be ex-post
ecient for unequal-entitlement proles.
20Proof. Consider two agents with r1 6= r2, and x a mechanism p. Once again we write the
worst-case regret for agent 1:
R1(b1) = max
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
r2 maxfp(b1;^ b)  ^ bg; ^ b  minfb1;v1g
r1 maxf^ b   p(b1;^ b)g; ^ b  maxfb1;v1g
b1   v1; b1 > v1
v1   b1; b1  v1
Let b1;b2 be the regret-optimizing strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively, and denote b1(0) =
c1;b1(1) = d1 and b2(0) = c2;b2(1) = d2.
Ex-post eciency along with the continuity of b1;b2 dictates that both players will have the
same bidding strategy, i.e., b1(v) = b2(v) for all v 2 [0;1]. Our argument proceeds in two steps.
First, ex-post eciency implies that the agent with the higher valuation will have to outbid her
opponent, i.e.,
v1  v2 , b1(v1)  b2(v2); 8(v1;v2)
Now if we assume that the bidding functions are continuous and we let v1;v2 ! v, the previous
inequality becomes an equality:
b1(v) = b2(v); 8v
Applying this condition to v = 0 and v = 1, we obtain c1 = b1(0) = b2(0) = c2 = c and
d1 = b1(1) = b2(1) = d2 = d.
Assume that agent 1 has a valuation of v1 = 0. Then we know that she must bid b(0) = c.
For c to be the optimal bid, it must be at the intersection of b1   v1 and r1 max^ bcf^ b   p(c;^ b)g.
Since
@p
b1 > 0, c will be the unique minimizer, as maxb^ cf^ b  p(^ c;^ b)g > maxbcf^ b  p(c;^ b)g for all
^ c < c. Substituting b1 = c and v1 = 0, c will have to satisfy
c = r1 max
^ bc
f^ b   p(c;^ b)g:
Recalling that agent 2 will also have to bid c upon seeing a valuation of v2 = 0, an equivalent
argument establishes that c will also need to satisfy
c = r2 max
^ bc
f^ b   p(^ b;c)g:
Thus we obtain
r1 max
^ bc
f^ b   p(c;^ b)g = r2 max
^ bc
f^ b   p(^ b;c)g:
21Anonymity implies that p(c;^ b) = p(^ b;c). Therefore, unless max^ b>cf^ b   p(c;^ b)g = 0, the above
implies that r1 = r2, a contradiction. So we must have
max
^ bc
f^ b   p(c;^ b)g = 0 ) p(c;d) = d:
Applying the same reasoning to v = 1, we obtain
max
^ bd
fp(d;^ b)  ^ bg = 0 ) p(d;c) = c:
Because ex-post eciency implies that c < d, we have reached a contradiction.
This proposition establishes that a large class of mechanisms can never hope to achieve ex-post
eciency. For instance, many anonymous mechanisms of the form p(b1;b2) = f(b1;b2)b1 + (1  
f(b1;b2))b2, where f is continuously dierentiable and 0 < f(b1;b2) < 1 for all b1;b2, will fail to
be ex-post ecient. This class obviously includes linear mechanisms for which 0 <  < 1.
5.4 Ex-post Individual Rationality and Bayesian-Nash Equilibria
In this section we analyze the implications of requiring ex-post individual rationality in the tradi-
tional Bayesian-Nash prot-maximizing setting. As we saw in Section 4, the binary-search mech-
anism is ex-post individually rational in the case of equal entitlements and uniform [0,1] utilities.
This result does not extend to general distributions. If entitlements are unequal, we prove that
the only mechanisms that could satisfy this property are ones in which, like the binary-search
mechanism, the price is a kind of a step-function of the bids.
Theorem 6 Suppose the agents' objective is to maximize expected prot and that r1 6= r2. Then
if a mechanism p(b1;b2) is ex-post individually rational, it must satisfy:
@p
@b1
=
@p
@b2
= 0 almost everywhere:
Proof. Fix a mechanism p. Assume that agent 1 and 2's utilities are i.i.d. with a cdf F. Suppose
agent 2 bids according to h2(v2), and let G1(v1;b1) denote agent 1's expected prot, given a
valuation of v1 and a bid of b1. We may write
G1(v1;b1) =
Z h 1
2 (b1)
0
r2(v1   p(b1;h2(v2))f(v2)dv2
+
Z 1
h
 1
2 (b1)
r1(p(b1;h2(v2))   v1)f(v2)dv2:
22Dierentiating the above with respect to b1 and setting the derivative equal to 0, we obtain
Z h
 1
2 (b1)
0
 r2(
@
@b1
p(b1;h2(v2))f(v2)dv2 + r2(v1   b1)
d[h 1
2 (b1)]
db1
f(h 1
2 (b1)) +
Z 1
h
 1
2 (b1)
r1
@
@b1
p(b1;h2(v2))f(v2)dv2   r1(b1   v1)
d[h 1
2 (b1)]
db1
f(h 1
2 (b1)) = 0:
Therefore in order for h1(v1) = v1 and h2(v2) = v2 to be an equilibrium, the following rst-order
conditions need to be satised:
Z v1
0
 r2
@
@b1
p(v1;v2)f(v2)dv2 +
Z 1
v1
r1
@
@b1
p(v1;v2)f(v2)dv2 = 0; 8v1
Z v2
0
 r1
@
@b2
p(v1;v2)f(v1)dv1 +
Z 1
v2
r2
@
@b2
p(v1;v2)f(v1)dv2 = 0; 8v2:
Now let v1 = v2 = v. By anonymity we have that @
@b1p(v1;v2) = @
@b2p(v2;v1). Adding the two
previous equalities gives us
Z v
0
@
@b1
p(v;u)f(u)du =
Z 1
v
@
@b2
p(u;v)f(u)du; 8v:
On the other hand, subtracting the same equalities, and assuming r1 6= r2, we obtain
Z v
0
@
@b1
p(v;u)f(u)du =  
Z 1
v
@
@b2
p(u;v)f(u)du; 8v:
Combining the two equalities, we obtain
Z v
0
@
@b1
p(v;u)f(u)du =
Z 1
v
@
@b2
p(u;v)f(u)du = 0; 8v:
Since f(v) > 0 and
@p
b1 ;
@p
b2  0, we conclude that
@p
@b1
=
@p
@b2
= 0 almost everywhere:
6 Conclusion
Standard buy-sell agreements are awed by forcing the proposer to make herself indierent to
buying out, or being bought out, by the responder, who will generally not be indierent and can
choose her preferred option [11]. By contrast, we proposed a class of symmetric mechanisms that,
by treating each partner equally, is fair to both.
23We studied partnership dissolution models under the novel assumption that agents act as
maximum-regret minimizers. We analyzed linear and binary search mechanisms and derived
expressions for the regret-optimizing equilibrium strategies that they induce. When agents have
equal entitlements to the partnership, we showed that linear mechanisms can achieve ex-post
eciency; the binary search mechanism satises the even stronger property of ex-post individual
rationality.
Switching to a Bayesian-Nash framework, linear mechanisms remain ex-post ecient. The
binary-search mechanism is ex-post individually rational for the case of uniformly distributed
utilities, but this is not the case for generally distributed utilities.
When entitlements are unequal, linear mechanisms, as well as the binary-search procedure,
do not satisfy these desirable properties. In fact, when entitlements are unequal and agents seek
to minimize regret, there is no mechanism with a strictly increasing price function that is ex-post
ecient. Likewise, when agents wish to maximize prot in such an asymmetric environment, the
only mechanisms that can satisfy ex-post individual rationality are ones in which the price has a
step-function structure, akin to the binary search mechanism.
The failure of several mechanisms to satisfy certain desirable properties is counterbalanced by
the positive results we found in one important case|when the two partners have equal entitle-
ments (i.e., 50 percent each). Under specied conditions, there is an ex-post ecient mechanism
linear mechanism, and the binary mechanism is truth-inducing and, therefore, ex-post individu-
ally rational. These mechanisms deserve to be experimented with, if not actually used, in this
important setting.
References
[1] D. Bergemann and K. Schlag (2005), \Robust Monopoly Pricing," Yale University, Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper, 1527.
[2] A. Borodin and R. El-Yaniv (1998), Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[3] R.R. Brooks and K.E. Spier (2004), "Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-
Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts," School of Law, Northwestern University, Law
and Economics Paper 19.
[4] K.Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (1983), \Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Oper-
ations Research, 31, 835{851.
24[5] P. Cramton, R. Gibbons, and P. Klemperer (1987), \Dissolving a Partnership Eciently,"
Econometrica, 55, 615{632.
[6] S. Eren and C. Maglaras (2006), \Pricing without Market Information," Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University, working paper.
[7] M. Y. Gerchak and J. D. Fuller (1992), \Optimal-Value Declaration in `Buy-Sell' Situations,"
Management Science, 38, 48{56.
[8] P. B. Linhart (2001), \Bargaining Solutions with Non-Standard Objectives," Review of Eco-
nomic Design, 6, 225{239.
[9] P. B. Linhart and R. Radner (1989), \Minimax-Regret Strategies for Bargaining over Several
Variables," Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 152{178.
[10] R. P. McAfee (1991), \Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 266{293.
[11] J. Morgan (n.d.), \Dissolving a Partnership (Un)Fairly," Hass School of Business and De-
partment of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, working paper.
[12] R. Myerson and M. Satterthwaite (1983), \Ecient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 29, 265{281.
[13] G. Perakis and G. Roels (2008), \Regret in the Newsvendor Model with Partial Information,"
Operations Research, 56, 188{203.
[14] L.J. Savage (1954), \The Foundations of Statistics", John Wiley and Sons, New York.
[15] J. L. Turner (2006), \Dissolving (In)eective Partnerships," Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Georgia, working paper.
25